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JURISDICTION
Myres S. McDougal
In public and private international
law, the word "jurisdiction "-in etymological origin, speaking the law-is
used to refer to the competence of a
state-the authority of a state as recognized by international decision-makers
and by other states-to make law for,
and to apply law to,particular events or
particular controversies. I emphasize the
word particular in order to distinguish,
as :.will be seen below, the claims to
authority with which we are here concerned from other and more comprehensive claims of state officials to continuous control over bases of power,
such as territory and people.
It is in this sense-in the sense of
competence or authority to prescribe
and apply law to particular events-that
the subject of Jurisdiction is important
to Naval Officers and it is in this sense
that, with your permission, I propose to
explore the subject. It needs no emphasis to this audience that the Naval
Officer is both the agent of the authority of one state and a possible
object of the application of authority of
other states. The authority of any particular officer may not be coextensive
with that of his state, depending upon
the hierarchy of command and degrees
of delegation, but for determining the
lawfulness of a controverted exercise of
authority by or upon an officer in
events involving other states, it is commonly necessary to consider the

comprehensive authority of a state as
against other states.
It has probably already been sensed
that this common use of the term
"jurisdiction, " which I suggest we
adopt, is not simple. The term does in
fact refer to certain reciprocal processes
of claim and of decision, of assertions of
authority by one state against other
states and of responding acceptance or
rejection by international decisionmakers or other states, which may
become quite complex.
In parenthesis, and by way of
apology, may I say that in order to be
both comprehensive and brief I must of
necessity make my remarks somewhat
abstract. The facts of the controversies
with which we deal are, however, often
most dramatic. A citizen of the United
States shoots a citizen of Brazil on
board a Swiss plane in flight from
Shannon to Gander. A citizen of the
United States seeks to levy upon a
warship of Napoleon anchored in an
American harbor, claiming the ship as
his private property formerly seized by
violence. Canadian officials invade New
York State and set an American barge
adrift over Niagara Falls. The United
States shoots an artificial satellite into
outer space, which traverses the air
space of the Soviet Union as it departs
or returns. A beautiful lady from the
Soviet Union leaps from an upper floor
of the Soviet Consulate in New York
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City into the waiting arms of a New
York policeman. A soldier of the United
States commits all the crimes in the
book while on holiday in France. A ship
flying the French flag rams a Turkish
llhip in the Sea of Marmora, killing
citizens of various nationalities. The
wife of the Chinese delegate to the
United Nations sues him for divorce and
alimony in New York City. The United
States tests a nuclear weapon in the
Pacific, and creates a molten inferno
where once there was an inhabited
tropical paradise-and so on. May I ask
you to recall, as I talk, cases such as
these and perhaps other cases from your
experience as an officer, or from our
directive, in order to give flesh and
blood to the very bare remarks I must
make?
For the purpose of attempting to
subdue the complexity of our subject, I
propose that we organize our inquiry
into three main, though not equally
extensive, parts:
First, and briefly, an examination of
the factual process in which states
assert, as against each other, claims to
exercise authority with respect to particular even ts.
Next, and in somewhat more detail,
an exploration of the processes of
decision by which the lawfulness of
claims, with some being accepted and
some rejected, is determined.
Finally, and as fully as our time will
permit, an examination of the more
important trends in decision and established policies with respect to claims
relating to the various spatial dO!llains:
land, waters, air space, and outer space.
This latter inquiry may enable us to
identify some of the explanatory factors
which have conditioned different
decisions and policies with respect to
the different spatial domains and,
hence, cautiously to project certain
possible developments into the future.
We begin with brief reference to the
factual process in which claims to jurisdiction are asserted. This process in-

cludes certilin claimants making, as
against each other, certain claims to the
exercise of authority, with ,respect to
events occurring within different spatial
domains, by differing methods, for
various general and specific objectives,
and under greatly varying conditions.
The claimants, who assert as against
each other claims to jurisdiction, are the
officials of nation-states, of territorially
organized communities. As such officials, they have at their disposal certain bases of power, including certain
continuous, but varying, control over
resources, over people, and over community value processes.
The claims to exercise authority we
have already described as claims to
competence to make and apply law. In
conventional terms such competence is
sometimes described as legislative,
executive, judicial, and administrative.
Such conventional terms refer, however,
more precisely to institutions rather
than to competences or functions. A
more comprehensive and scientific
d.escription might make reference to
intelligence, recommending, prescribing,
invoking, applying, appraising and
terminating functions. For our immediate purposes, purposes relevant to the
more important concerns of the Naval
Officer, a focus upon !he prescribing
and applying functions, the making and
execution of law, will perhaps suffice. It
is, however, important to keep clearly in
mind the distinction alluded to above
between the comprehensive claims by
state officials to those continuous controls over resources, people, and value
processes which constitute their general
and enduring bases of power and the
more particular claims to exercise
authority with respect to occasional,
episodic events which are ordinarily
described as claims of jurisdiction. The
former claims insist that "this is my
territory" or "this is my national" or
"these are my value processes" for all
purposes; the latter claims insist only
that, because of certain factors of
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spatial location or of nationality or of
impact upon national interest and so on,
the claimant can make law for or apply
law to a particular event in controversy.
These very different factual claims are
governed by very different technical
rules which seek quite different policies.
The particular events with respect to
which jurisdiction is claimed may, of
course, occur in anyone of the spatial
domains: upon the territory of the
claimant state or of another state, upon
the high seas, within the air space over
the claimant state or another state or
the high seas, or in outer space. The
complexity in institutional detail and
range of spatial impact of such particular events may, as was seen in the cases
alluded to above, vary greatly. The
actors in such events may be official or
non-official, individual or group, corporate or non-corporate, national or nonnational, civilian or military. The values
at stake in the interaction may embrace
security, power, wealth, enlightenment,
respect, rectitude, or others. The
changes being contested may have taken
place by agreement or by deprivation, by
consent or by coercion. The territorial
range of the impacts of the significant
events may extend to one or several
states and mayor may not include the
state of the claimant. Resources affected may vary from land to ships and
aircraft or spacecraft or other movables,
and may be variously located. States
other than that of the claimant mayor
may not have engaged in "acts of state"
with respect to the same contested value
changes and, where such acts of state
are asserted, they may be legislative,
executive, or judicial. The state whose
prior acts of state are invoked mayor
may not have been recognized by the
claimant or other states, and so on.
The methods by which claims are
asserted are commonly diplomatic in
form, ranging from unilateral assertions
by a single state through the multiple
variations of group or multilateral claim.
Yet omnipresent behind the diplomatic

forms, and employed in varying combinations and with differing degrees of
intensity and overtness, are the other
familiar instruments of policy: ideological, economic, and military.
The objectives for which officials
assert claims to jurisdiction embrace all
the objectives characteristic of the
nation-state: in the most abstract form,
the protection and enhancement of the
bases of power of self and of allies, the
weakening and disintegration of the
bases of power of enemies and potential
enemies, and the effectiv~ employment
of all available bases of power for
maximization of all the values of the
territorial body politic.
The conditions under which claims
are asserted include, again in most
abstract statement, all the variables of a
global power process, of a world arena
in which the territorially organized communities which we call states, and other
participants such as transnational political parties, pressure groups, and business
associations, continuously engage each
other with all instruments of policy.
Among the variables, or factors, of
greatest significance for our immediate
purposes, purposes of accounting for
past or projecting future decisions about
jurisdiction may be mentioned: the
number, spatial location, and relative
strength of the participants in the arena;
the state of technological development
for purposes of communication, transport, production, and destruction; and
the degrees of intensity of the participants' expectations of violence.
With this brief orientation in the
factual process of claim, let us now turn
to the other and reciprocal process, the
process of decision by which the lawfulness of asserted claims is determined.
This second process includes, in comprehensive formulation, certain established
decision-makers, seeking certain shared
objectives, by the elaboration and application of certain authoritative principles, under certain conditions.
The decision-makers established by
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the authoritative perspectives of the
participants in the world arena include,
of course, the officials of international
tribunals and organizations and of
specially constituted arbitral tribunals.
But by far the most important decisionmakers, important both in the quantitative terms of the number of decisions
made and in the qualitative terms of the
significance of the issues determined,
are those same nation-state officials who
in another capacity are mere claimants.
The decisions of these officials are taken
in countless interactions in foreign
offices, special conferences, national
courts, national legislatures, and so on.
It may perhaps bear emphasis, because
so much misconception prevails upon
the point, that this does not mean that
there are no objective decision-makers
for questions of jurisdiction, or of international law generally. Though any particular official of a state may on occasion be a claimant for his state, on
multiple other occasions he is among
the officials of the seventy-nine odd
states who in a given instance are
passing upon the lawfulness of the
claims of the officials of the eightieth
state. In this latter capacity the state
official may be just as objective, and
just as much moved by perspectives
shared in the whole community of
statcs, as a municipal decision-maker
upon internal problems is objective and
is moved by perspectives shared in the
territorial community which he represents. The duality in function of nationstate officials does not represent a lack
of internationalization and objectivity
in function, but rather a lack of specialization and of centralization.
The shared objectives of the established decion-makers of the world arena
include, of course, the characteristic
objectives of nation-states mentioned
above, both of protecting bases of
power and of promoting employment of
such bases in the maximum production
of all values. Beyond these, however, are
certain other objectives which are a

function of the fact that a number of
such territorially organized communities
must interact in a common world arena.
Among the objectives of this second
type perhaps the most important is that
of creating a certain stability in the
expectations of all decision-makers that
the aggregate flow of cases will be
handled in certain agreed ways, with a
minimum assertion of raw, effective
power-a stability of expectation of
uniformity in decision which will, in
other words, permit rational power and
other value calculations with a minimum disruption from unrestrained
coercion and violence. Still another such
objective is that of promoting efficiency
not only in the disposition of controversies but also in all value interactions
across boundaries and in the exploitation of world resources best enjoyed in
common. It may be recalled that in the
Hydrogen Bomb article the major policy
purpose which we found to inspire the
whole regime of the law of the sea was
"not merely the negation of restrictions
upon navigation and fishing but also the·
promotion of the most advantageousthat is, the most conserving and fully
utilizing-peaceful use and development
by all peoples of a great common
resource covering two-thirds of the
world's surface, for all contemporary
values. "
The principles which established
decision-makers elaborate and apply, for
achievement of all these shared objectives, are of manifold reference and
varying degrees of generality. For brief
indication, they may be described as of
three different types. The first type is
composed of those principles sometimes
called the "bases" of jurisdiction-the
principle of territoriality, the principle
of nationality, the protective theory,
the principle of passive personality, and
the principle of universality in the name
of which a state, which has acquired
some effective control over persons or
resources, asserts its authority and is in
fact authorized by external decision-
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makers to exercise such authority to
make and apply its law to certain
particular events in which such persons
or resources have been involved. 'fhe
second type of principle is composed of
those principles by which a state,
though it has acquired such effective
control over persons or resources,
decides, or is required to decide, that it
will yield its effective power in deference to the "acts of state" or the
"immunities" of another state and
permit that state to make and apply its
law to the events in question. The third
type of principle is constituted by those
principles which individualize both sets
of complementary principles indicated
above, both those embodying the primary assertions of authority and those
embodying deferences to others, to take
into account the special characteristics
of the various spatial domains: territory,
the high seas, air space, and outer space.
The point which commonly requires
most emphasis to non-lawyers is that
these various principles are not designed
as precise and rigid commands, arbitrarily dictating preordained conclusions, but rather as flexible and malleable guides to rational and reasonable
decision. A little work with the actual
decisions quickly makes it clear, first,
that the major principles, asserting
authority and yielding deference, are
complementary in form, permitting
decision in any direction; and, secondly,
that within anyone set of principles the
major concepts are so vaguely defined as
to permit the ascription of an infinite
variety of concrete meaning, and hence,
the justification of a considerable number of alternatives in decision. The
function of the various principles is,
accordingly, not dogmatically to dictate
decision but rather to focus the attention of the decision-maker upon all the
significant features of a context in
controversy, and, hence, to assist the
decision-maker in assessing the relevance
of such features in relation to each
other. Thus, the territoriality principle

points to the locus of events in controversy, and the range of their territorial
impact, and emphasizes the importance
of the resource base in the community
process in which people apply institutions to resources for the production of
values. The "territorial" principle is, in
other words, but an elliptical expression
of a "community" principle. Similarly,
the nationality principle points to the
primary community allegiance of the
actors in an event and emphasizes the
importance of manpower and membership in community value processes. The
protective principle, similarly, in authorizing a state to take measures
against direct attack upon its security
and other values, though the events
occur abroad, constitutes an explicit
recognition of the major policy framework which we have suggested for the
whole subject of jurisdiction. The
passive personality theory that the state
of the nationality of an injured party
has jurisdiction wherever events occur,
and equivalent theories permitting the
diplomatic protection of citizens
abroad, again emphasizes the importance of community membership.
The universality principle, similarly,
emphasizes the common interest of all
states in repressing unauthorized violence upon the high seas, war crimes,
slave trading, and comparable deprivations of human dignity. The doctrine of
deference to the "acts of state" of
another government, to turn to some of
the complementary principles, is a clear
expression of the recognized need for
reciprocal tolerance and of the sanctioning fear of retaliation. The principles
embodying immunity for state officials
and organs, for ambassadors and warships, are, finally, expressions of concession to mutual dignity and efficiency
in indispensable intercourse. _The function of all such principles might perhaps
be said, in sum, to be to authorize the
decision-makers of the state most affected by any particular events to
decide the law for that event, upon
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condition that it take into account the
degrees of involvement of the values of
other states in such, and other comparable, events.
The conditions in the context of
which established decision-makers must
operate are, in most general formulation, of course, the same as for claimants. Among the factors most significant
for trend in decision may be mentioned,
however, both the degree of interdependence in fact between states for
the achievement of demanded values
and the degree to which decision-makers
have knowledge of whatever interdependence in fact exists. Such factors
may vitally affect both trends in decision and the sanctions which are available for making decisions effective.
With orientation now in both the
factual process of claim and the authoritative process of decision, let·us tum,
finally, to the promised examination of
the more important trends in decision
and established policies with respect to
the various spatial domains.
We begin with the land-base of a
state, and will talk of "territory, "
though territory is a legalistic concept
which embraces, as is well known, not
merely land but certain waters and air
space as well.
It is a commonplace, today, of both
public and private international law that
the territorial principle of jurisdiction
remains the most basic organizing principle in a world order constituted primarily of, and by, territorially organized
states. It is this principle which, first,
authorizes the decision-makers of any
particular territorial community in
which resources are located and events
occur, as representatives of the community most concerned with such resources and most affected by such
events, to prescribe and apply law with
respect to such resources and events;
and, second, permits the decisionmakers of all such territorial communities, considered as a larger global community, to order, by the process of

mutual deference and tolerance indicated above in application of this principle, the larger affairs transcending the
boundaries of any single community
with the highest degree of economy and
fairness and the highest degree of stability in common expectation.
One of the clearest expositions of
this principle, with indication of its
roots and function, is that of Professor
AIf Ross of Denmark. I quote:
It is a historical fact that the
various states are separated from
each other and bounded territorially. This of course is not
fortuitous but deeply rooted in
the nature of the case. The states
are prirriarily an organization of
power. Each of them claims to be,
within a certain territory separated from others, the supreme
power in relation to its subjects (a
self-governing community). The
simplest principle, almost a matter
of course, for the individualization and separation of these
competing instruments of power
is the spatial or territorial. 1
Professor Ross adds:
In conformity herewith the
fundamental international legal
norm of the distribution of competence is to the effect that every
state is competent, and exclusively competent, within its own
territory to perform acts whichactually or potentially-consist in
the working of the compulsory
apparatus of the state (the maxim
of territorial supremacy).2
The most important aspect, the hallmark, of this principle is, as Professor
Ross indicates, in its prescription of
exclusivity for the territorial sovereign.
The principle serves not merely as an
expression of the comprehensive power
of the territorial sovereign to exercise its
authority over all resources, persons,
and activities located, acting, or occurring within its domain but also as a
prohibition addressed to the officials of
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all other states requiring them to keep
hands off and out. It is, further, by this
principle that the territorial sovereign is
authorized to subordinate to its effective power all the various functional
groups; parties, pressure groups, and
private associations, domestic or foreign, which operate within its boundaries. This notion of the supremacy of
the territorial sovereign over all nonterritorial representatives is, indeed,
basic to the very conception of the
territorially organized state and its
emergence was undoubtedly conditioned by the same factors which conditioned the emergence of the nationstate. In days when the strategy of
attack was by horizontal encirclement
and with primitive weapons, spatial contiguity, walls, and moats, and fixed
boundaries were perhaps found to be an
indispensable asset in defense; and
security and the greater production of
demanded values were found to depend
upon the monopolization of territorial
authority and control and not in its
common enjoyment with functional or
other nonterritorial competitors.
It is familiar learning that certain
internal waters, a still debated extent of
air space, and in certain measure a
narrow belt of the oceans, called the
"territorial sea," are universally comprehended within the concept of "territory" for purposes of jurisdiction. The
degree of exclusivity in authority which
is claimed with respect to internal
waters and the territorial sea is, however, commonly somewhat less than
with respect to land. The officials of
states other than the territorial state are
under certain conditions permitted to
exercise authority with respect to events
occurring upon ships which fly their flag
even when such ships are in internal
waters. Still greater generosity is commonly accorded when such ships are
tr aversing the territorial sea; this
generosity is, of course, summed up in
the much discussed right of innocent
passage.

The broad scope of the jurisdiction
which state officials claim under the
territorial principle of jurisdiction may
perhaps best be demonstrated by
reference to one subordinate application
of the principle which is known as the
doctrine of "impact territoriality." The
tenor of this doctrine is that even
though certain events occur beyond the
boundaries of the claimant state, perhaps even within the domain of another
state, if such events have important
consequences to the value processes of
the claimant state, the latter may lawfully apply whatever effective control it
may have over the actors in such events,
or the resources of such actors, for the
reasonable protection of its interests.
Thus, the United States has, under this
doctrine, justified the application of its
antitrust statutes to agreements, made
abroad between nonnationals, and contemplating performance only abroad,
when such agreements were clearly intended to affect prices and production
within the United States. Some other
states, as well as a number of American
lawyers, have contested this application
by the United States of the doctrine of
impact territoriality, contending that
the doctrine is only applicable to such
simple matters as the shooting of guns
across boundaries, but the practice of
the United States would'seem to be well
within the compass of a broad policy
authorizing decision by the territorial
community most importantly affected
by particular events.
For purposes of dispelling a common
misconception, it may be desirable to
mention also a doctrine converse to that
of impact territoriality. The import of
this doctrine is that when a state exercises its jurisdiction by application of its
authority to persons or resources actually physically present within its territorial domain-that is, controlling persons or resources located within the
spatial sphere of its exclusive sovereignty-the mere fact that the exercise
of such jurisdiction may have factual
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consequences, factual effects, beyond
the boundaries of the acting state,
whether upon the high seas or in the
domain of another state, is legally irrele:
vant In our contemporary interdependent world, in which everybody's
activities affect those of everybody else,
no other conclusion could be tolerable.
If a state's laws were invalid merely
because their application has effects
upon the interests and activities of
people beyond its boundaries, government could not go on. The application
by the United States of its antitrust
laws, for example, to persons within its
domain obviously affects business activities over all the world; and what is true
of antitrust laws is no less true of
commercial laws generally, immigration
laws, maritime laws, monetary controls,
and so on.
It is, of course, from their territorial
base that state officials project all the
controls they assert over their nationals
abroad and over nonnationals, through
the protective, passive personality, and
universality
theories, for activities
beyond the territorial domain of the
claimant state. The details of all these
important claims to authority, fully
sanctioned in most part by international
law, we must perforce leave to others or
for another day. It may, however, be
noted that the nationality principle extends not only to individuals but also to
ships, aircraft and corporations, and
perhaps even to spacecraft, and that
under the nationality principle the
United States has asserted authority to
control its citizens in almost every
aspect of life, from taxes through the
gamut of crime and regulation of
business activity to death for treason.
It should be remembered, also, in
final consideration of the territorial
principle, that state officials, even when
they have effective control over persons
and resources, may on occasion be
required by certain principles of "act of
state" and "immunity," completely
complementary to the various principles

which we 'have been considering, to
forego the exercise of their own authority and to yield control to others.
The details of these principles ramify
through various requirements with
respect to what constitutes appropriate
legislative, executive, and judicial acts of
state which must be honored by other
states, and through a lot of relatively
uninteresting, though not entirely unimportant, niceties with respect to the
various exemptions of heads of state,
diplomats, public ships, and public
corporations and agencies.
From dull, dry land, let us now turn,
after much too long, to the oceans of
the world. Here, as you all know, we
find a completely different development Because of various historical
conditions, including most notably
perhaps the fact of a multipolar arena,
exhibiting a number of relatively equal
participants, and a state of technological
and industrial development in which
nobody was able to chase everybody
else off, emphasis in the law of the sea
for some centuries has not been upon
exclusivity in use but upon use in
common. The experience of 150 years
at least has shown that the oceans of the
world can be used concurrently by all,
without any special injury to anyone,
for the great common advantage. By
that elaborate set of complementary
doctrines, known as the customary law
of the sea, it has been possible effectively to internationalize the oceans of
the world, without the establishment of
much special international machinery.
One set of these doctrines, generally
referred to under the label of "freedom
of the seas," was formulated, and is
commonly invoked, to protect unilateral claims to ,navigati<?n, fishing, flying over the oceans, cable-laying, and
other similar uses. The other set of
doctrines includes prescriptions summed
up in a wide variety of technical terms
such as "territorial sea," "contiguous
zone," "jurisdiction," "continental
shelf," "self-defense," and so on,
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protecting such other interests as
security, enforcement of health, neutrality and customs regulations, conservation or monopolization of fisheries,
exploitation of the sedentary fisheries
and mineral resources of the seabed, and
the conducting of naval manoeuvres,
military exercises, and other peacetime
defensive activities, and so on.
The most important elements in the
total structure are, of course:
1. The confining of the territorial
belt to relatively narrow limits;
2. The honoring of contiguous zones
for all important national purposes, in
the absence of unreasonable interference with others;
3. The common use of the broader
expanses of the oceans for the great
variety of purposes indicated above;
4. The notions of the nationality of
ships and of the national responsibility
of states for their ships; and
5. The law of piracy for the repression of unauthorized violence.
The details of this structure are perhaps
already too familiar to you and may be
discussed by others. What I should like
to emphasize is the high degree of
flexibility and adaptability in the whole
structure, with reference especially to
the overriding principle of common
interest and the omnipresent specific
test, whatever its verbal formulation, of
reasonableness. Some of the conventional presentations of the law of the
sea seem to me, quite unfortunately, to
approach caricature of the actual
process of decision. The most recent
report, the 1956 report, of the United
Nations International Law Commission,
with all deference to the distinguished
jurists who did the work, does not, I
fear, entirely escape misconception. Its
most grievous defect resides in a some·
what mechanical overrigidification of
many technical concepts, ineluding both
the notions of the freedom of the seas
and of contiguous zones. In Article 66,
for example, only one contiguous zone
is provided for, and it is confined to the

protection of customs, fiscal and sanitary measures. No mention is made of
security. Some of you will undoubtedly
share with me, too, misgivings that the
ambiguity in Article 3 of the provision
with respect to the territorial sea rule
continues to encourage expansionist
claims. From an accurate description of
past practice, it may, of course, be seen
that there is not simply one contiguous
zone, but multiple contiguous zones for
all important national interests, and that
security is one of the interests which has
been most honored in prior practice.
Freedom of the seas, similarly, has been
in practice regarded as no more of an
absolute than any of the other doctrines
protecting unilateral assertions of authority. The fact is that in appropriate
contexts all important interests, reasonably asserted, have achieved protection.
From all this, the answer to the
question as to the legality of defensive
zones, is not difficult. The answer
depends upon whether in context the
claim is reasonable. How high is the
expectation of violence? How important
and how large is the area claimed? What
is the extent and the duration of interference with others? And so on.
Let us turn now from the oceans of
the world back to the air space above
land. With respect to this spatial
domain, it is familiar history how exclusivity once again prevailed over common use. Despite a number of demands
at the beginning of this century for a
freedom of airspace comparable to the
freedom of the seas, it soon became
clear that vertical power could control
horizontal and that sovereignty over
land and territorial sea could not be
protected without sovereignty over air
space, and the conclusion was certain.
The history of this development has
been recounted many times, and before
this college by the distinguished authority, Professor John C. Cooper. I will
not repeat it. The essential point is that
universal national practice, as consolidated, for examples, in the Paris
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Convention of 1919 and the Chicago
Convention of 1944, has established
that same exclusivity of jurisdiction of
the territorial sovereign for overlying
airspace as for underlying land. With the
elaborate qualifications to this exclusivity created by various conventions in
the interest of international commerce,
we need not now concern ourselves. The
customary doctrine does not recognize
even such right of innocent passage as
qualifies the territorial sea.
Finally, we reach that domain of
most contemporary speculative interest,
the outer spaces. To pose the problem it
is convenient to quote a few remarks
from a column by Roscoe Drummond
entitled ''The Blue Wild Yonder":
Soon this will be no theoretical
matter. The United States, the
Soviet Union and Britain have
announced that they are building
satellites to revolve 200 to 300
miles above the earth's surface
and are planning to dispatch a few
high-altitude rockets beyond the
earth's atmospheric coat. The
scientists foresee manned space
stations coasting in the earth's
orbit for indefinite periods, useful
for refueling space ships and for
astronomical and physical research. Next step: experimental
flights to the moon; scheduled
flights later.
The lawyers are just beginning
to get a slippery grip on the legal
aspects of outer space, issues of
overhead sovereignty and freedom
of passage.
Turning to this slippery grip of the
lawyers, I would refer to the remarks of
two very distinguished commentators
on international law. The first are those
of Mr. Wilfred Jenks, who is perhaps
one of the two or three most eminent
writers in the field of international law
today, which appeared in the International and Comparative Law Quarterly
of January 1956. Mr. Jenks concludes

that air space beyond the atmosphere of
the earth is a res extra commercium
incapable by its nature of appropriation
on behalf of any particular sovereignty
based on a fraction of the earth's
surface. He argues in justification that
"Space beyond the atmosphere of the
earth presents a much closer analogy to
the high seas than to the air space above
the territory of a state" and that "the
projection of the territorial sovereignty
of a state beyond the atmosphere above
its territory would be so wholly out of
relation to the scale of the universe as to
be ridiculous; it would be rather like the
island of St. Helena claiming jurisdiction
over the Atlantic." He notes that such a
projection of sovereignty "would give us
a series of adjacent irregular shaped
cones with a constantly changing content" and that celestial bodies would
move in and out of the zones all the
time. He concludes that "in these circumstances the concept of a space cone
of sovereignty is a meaningless and
dangerous abstraction. "
The most obvi0us defect in Mr.
Jenks' analysis is that it does not go far
enough. Because of certain technological considerations outlined by Mr.
Jenks, it is of course impossible for all
nation-states to project exclusive claims
to control indefinitely into outer space.
There is little point to seeking territorial
location for either threats from outer
space or the assertions of effective
power to cope with such threats. The
important problems will relate to the
reconciliation of multiple assertions of
effective control in spaces accessible to
all and, hence, common to all in the
absence of territorial nexus individualized to anyone state.
Building upon Mr. Jenks, Professor
Cooper, who previously had taken a
position emphasizing the importance of
potentialities of effective control in
resolving these issues, now offers some
very curious suggestions based upon a
misconception of the law of the sea.
Professor Cooper first argues in great
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detail that previous agreements are irrelevant with respect to the question of
outer space and he includes much detail
on prior definitions of "air space" and
"aircraft," all of which would appear
unnecessary. The reasons these previous
agreements are irrelevant is that neither
the major purposes nor the detailed
expectations of the parties who negotiated and ratified them included the
present problem of outer space.
There is, of course, as yet no customary law of outer space. The recommendations which Professor Cooper
derives from the public international
law of the high seas would appear
further to be quite unsound and improbable. He recommends that we
establish a regime of outer space which
he regards as comparable to the law of
the sea. He suggests that nation·states
affirm by agreement that the subjacent
state has full sovereignty over the relatively narrow belt of atmospheric space
above -it. Next, the "sovereignty of the
subjacent state" would extend upward
to include a "contiguous space" of 300
miles, with a right of transit through it
for all nonmilitary craft when ascending
or descending. Finally, he recommends
acceptance of the principle "that all
space above 'contiguous space' is free
for the passage of all instrumentalities. "
Among several observations which
might be made upon Professor Cooper's
thesis, the primary one is that it completely misconceives the law of the sea.
An accurate portrayal of the law of the
sea does not show us a nice set of
boundaries-three miles of territorial
sea, a single contiguous zone, and
absolute freedom of use beyond. It
shows a continual demand to increase
the width of the territorial sea, a great
variety of contiguous zones, not one but
a dozen or more, and many examples of
power being asserted unilaterally on the
oceans of the world for all kinds of
national purposes. The great variety of
contiguous zones and unilateral
assertions of competence are today

honored in authoritative prescription.
We might observe also that Professor
Cooper's notions are built upon the
existing state of technology with respect
to the distances to which effective
control from land surfaces is presently
possible. But one cannot assume that
this technology is static and that we will
not later have even more effective control of objects at an even greater distance in space.
To come to any practical recommendations upon this problem would require a great deal of information concerning factual conditions and probable
future developments, much of which
information is of course not now available. It is, however, my understanding
that, at the moment, neither Russia nor
the United States is technologically
capable of shooting down objects
launched into outer space and also that
neither can even control such an object
after it reaches outer space. One would
also gather that it would be impossible
for either state to launch a satellite
without traversing the air space above
the other, which traversing would of
course be a technical infringement of
the exclusive zone claimed by each. It is
my understanding, further, that there is
not even one chance in a million of any
damage being done to the surface by the
falling of one of the presently contemplated satellites.
The apparent immediate uses of the
proposed satellites will be to photo·
graph various parts of the earth's surface, to fix the location of cities much
more precisely than has been possible in
the past, and to obtain information
about atmospheric densities and temperatures above certain heights. The use
of this information for various purposes,
including the obvious military utility,
would probably emerge from some later
stage of development built around the
knowledge gained by these initial experimental flights.
Although one cannot at the moment
really anticipate the contributions that
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might be made to scientific knowledge
from satellites, it would seem probable
that in the future, as in the past,
considerations of security will be the
dominant concern of nation-state officials. 1£ it is considered that security is
endangered by the movement of space
satellites above the state, and if the
technological capability exists to do so,
then such satellites will be destroyed,
and this eventuality seems highly likely
to come about by mutual tolerance even
if a contiguous space for security is not
established through international agreement.
The development just described with
respect to security interests, which is
closely analogous to the way in which
the law of the sea has evolved, might
also be expected to emerge with respect
to other problems once the security
interest is protected. Apart from the
security aspect, the question is whether
all the decision-makers of all the nation-

states have sufficient interest in the
various other purposes served by space
travel-scientific inquiry, commercial,
health, etc.-that a mutual tolerance in
freedom of use will evolve. Since there
would appear to be a strong common
interest in promoting productive use of
the outer spaces, the emergence of such
mutual tolerance would seem highly
probable. On the other hand, as with
security, reasonable unilateral assertions
of authority to protect the interests of
particular states could be accommodated within the structure of prescription, assuring freedom of use for all.
In sum, the probable developments
with respect to outer spaces will include
both the assertions of effective power
from the land base that has characterized territorial jurisdiction and some
features of the common enjoyment and
mutual toleration that have characterized the customary international law
of the sea.

NOTES
1. A. Ross, A Textbook of International Law, 1947, p. 137.
2. Ibid., p. 138.
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